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The Law of Unintended Consequences: The 2015 E.U. 
Insolvency Regulation and Employee Claims in Cross-
Border Insolvencies 
Joshua W. Eastby 
Abstract 
 
The European Union recently amended its Regulation on insolvency proceedings to 
implement lessons learned during the previous iteration’s lifespan. However, its interaction with 
the E.U.’s Guarantee Mandate leads to unintended consequences in cross-border insolvencies 
that can frustrate the animating principles of both laws. This Comment argues for a dynamic 
approach to Member States’ guarantee funds under the Guarantee Mandate that will pay 
employee claims according to national law, rather than allowing the claim to be governed wholly 
by the law of the State administering the insolvency proceedings. This change will eliminate the 
disparate impact that changing substantive law can have on otherwise similarly-situated 
employees, while at the same time allowing Member States to internalize the costs of the disparate 
legal regimes, allowing them to more fully realize their national policy choices and allocate the 
internalized costs to the various stakeholders as they see fit. This change would reduce the costs 
disparately imposed on employees based solely on where their employer is headquartered, and 
increase the efficiency of the cross-border insolvency administration process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Consider the case of a firm that has fallen on hard times. At one point, it 
was profitable, and the demand for its services was robust. Now, though, whether 
because of market shocks, mismanagement, or a changing marketplace, the firm 
is not as financially healthy as it has been in the past. The firm has found itself 
insolvent—unable to repay its obligations as they become due—and, in fact, has 
stopped making payments entirely. At this point, some form of legal proceeding 
would be used either to liquidate the firm, repaying such of its obligations as the 
firm’s assets will permit, or to restructure the firm to get it back on the path to 
regular operation.1 In the case of liquidation, the creditors of the firm would file 
claims seeking payment out of the debtor’s remaining assets.2 Generally, the State 
in which the insolvency proceeding takes place would provide the governing law, 
determining, among other things, the order in which claims are prioritized.3 
Because of the high variability in insolvency regimes and fundamental policy 
choices across States, the initial choice of where to open the insolvency 
proceedings can have a large effect on the distributional outcome of the 
insolvency proceedings.4 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Council Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19 (EU), pmbl. (7), (10), art. 1(1) 
[hereinafter “E.U. Regulation”] (noting that “[b]ankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up 
of insolvent companies or other legal person, [etc.] . . . should be covered by this Regulation”; and 
further that “[t]he scope of this Regulation should extend to proceedings which promote the rescue 
of economically viable but distressed businesses and which give a second chance to entrepreneurs”). 
In the United States, the Bankruptcy Code provides a number of methods of relief, including 
“Chapter 7 (liquidation) . . . [and] Chapter 11 (reorganization).” See, for example, Craig Peyton 
Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth or Consequences: The Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 506 (1997). See also 11 
U.S.C. §§ 701–84, 1101–74 (2014). 
2  See, for example, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45(1)–(3). 
3  See, for example, id. art. 7(1)–(2) (“Save as otherwise provided . . . the law applicable to insolvency 
proceedings and their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such 
proceedings are opened.”).  
4  Cf. id. As an illustrative example of the types of disparate outcomes that result from changing which 
State’s laws apply, see JANIS SARRA, EMPLOYEE AND PENSION CLAIMS DURING COMPANY 
INSOLVENCY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 62 JURISDICTIONS 3 (2008) [hereinafter SARRA STUDY]. 
For example, a German employee of a German company will be subject to German law in their 
employer’s insolvency proceedings; German law provides for no preference at any level for 
employee claims in insolvency. See id. at 249–50. Likewise, French law governs the claims of a 
French company’s employees, and French law grants strong protection to employee claims, giving 
them a super-priority over all other forms of preferential debt. Id. at 237–38. However, under the 
E.U. Regulation, a French employee of a German company would receive no priority, though an 
identically-situated French employee of a French company would. Id.; E.U. Regulation, supra note 
1 art. 7(1)–(2). Even for States with somewhat similar insolvency regimes (e.g., two States that grant 
priority to employee claims), the outcome can still vary significantly. For example, Croatia provides 
a priority for employee claims ahead of all other unsecured claims, but behind secured claims and 
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Of particular interest in this Comment is the protection employee claims 
receive in insolvency proceedings. Employees are nearly always afforded some 
sort of preferential treatment in insolvency proceedings, but the precise details of 
the legal regimes and the differing limitations imposed by States on employee 
claims entitled to this preferential treatment result in a wide degree of variance 
with regards to the outcome of employee claims in insolvency proceedings.5  
The high degree of variability between national insolvency regimes was recently 
acutely felt in the highly interconnected markets of the European Union (E.U.). 
In 2015, the E.U. enacted the E.U. Regulation, which was designed to incorporate 
some of the lessons learned from implementing its predecessor enacted only 
fifteen years prior.6 During the same period, the E.U. enacted the Guarantee 
Mandate.7 The E.U. Regulation sought to standardize and streamline the 
administration of insolvency proceedings, and did so via a regime of mandatory 
coordination and choice of law rules.8 Recognizing the necessity of protecting 
employees when their employers become insolvent, the Guarantee Mandate 
requires that E.U. Member States establish guarantee funds that provide for a 
minimum level of payment for employee claims.9 Member States can set a level of 
guarantee higher than, but not less than, the minimum.10  
The unintended consequence11 of the interaction between these related, but 
separately-developed, legal regimes, however, is that Member States can 
                                                 
claims against the estate. SARRA STUDY, at 205. Thus, a French employee of a Croatian company 
would be in a worse position than a French employee of a French company, whereas a Croatian 
employee of a French company would receive a windfall.  
5  Id. at 9–10, 130 (2008) (“[T]he issue of social claims[, i.e., employee claims,] has received 
considerable public attention in numerous jurisdictions . . . . Globally, there has been recognition 
that the problems faced by employees on insolvency are somewhat unique, and require special 
attention in the course of liquidation or restructuring of the financially distressed business.”). See 
also id. at 4 (noting that the “World Bank has called for special treatment of employee claims during 
insolvency, recognizing that workers are a vital part of an enterprise”). 
6  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 at pmbl. (1). In 2000, the E.U. promulgated the E.C. Regulation, 
which attempted to streamline the coordination and administration of insolvencies that presented 
with cross-border issues. Council Regulation 1346/2000, of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter “E.C. Regulation”]. 
7  Directive 2008/98/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 22 October 2008 on 
the Protection of Employees in the Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer, 2008 O.J. (L 283) 
36 [hereinafter “Guarantee Mandate”]. The Guarantee Mandate resulted from a similar process of 
successive amendments to the original Directive before ultimately being recast in its current form. 
Compare Guarantee Mandate with Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the 
Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Protection of Employees in the 
Event of the Insolvency of Their Employer 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23. 
8  See generally E.U. Regulation, supra note 1.  
9  See Guarantee Mandate, at pmbl (3), art. 3. 
10  See generally Guarantee Mandate. 
11  Cf. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894, 
894–904 (1936). 
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customize their domestic insolvency proceedings in ways that produce negative 
distributional consequences for employees based on where their employer is 
headquartered.12 Member States can choose to have a higher level of guarantee 
than the Guarantee Mandate requires, and they can elect to have a priority in the 
insolvency proceeding13 in addition to the Guarantee Mandate’s required level of 
protection. Thus, so long as their guarantee fund pays at least the minimum 
required by the Guarantee Mandate, they can customize their insolvency regime 
according to their national policy choices.14  
The problem arises when a company headquartered in a non-priority-
granting State employs citizens of a priority-granting State.15 In this situation, 
employees in a priority-granting State “A” receive differential treatment 
depending on where their employer is headquartered. An employee of a domestic 
company will receive the payment from the guarantee fund as well as the priority 
in the insolvency proceeding, whereas an otherwise identically situated employee 
working for a company headquartered in a non-priority-granting State “B” would 
receive the payment from the guarantee fund, but no priority in insolvency.16  
In cases where the debtor’s assets located in the priority-granting Member 
State “A” are sufficient to satisfy the employees’ claims, the difference in 
applicable law does not affect the employees’ recovery. This is not the case, 
however, in situations where the debtor has assets sufficient to satisfy the secured 
creditors and with at least some amount left for unsecured creditors. When the 
unsecured creditors are not paid in full, the change in applicable law between the 
                                                 
12  See infra Section II(D)(1). For analytical clarity, this Comment uses the term “headquartered” as a 
stand-in for Center of Main Interest (“COMI”). This is not to detract from the interesting analytical 
questions posed by COMI determinations. See, for example, Richard Sheldon, QC, Introduction to 
CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY 1, 8 (Richard Sheldon, ed., 3d ed. 2011). See also, for example, Mark 
Arnold, The Insolvency Regulation, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY 16, 16–97 (Richard Sheldon, ed., 
3d ed. 2011) (analyzing the E.C. Regulation, and discussing how the COMI is determined 
thereunder). 
13  The default positioning of employee claims in insolvency is that of the unsecured creditor; 
unsecured creditors only take from the insolvency distribution to the extent that the claims of 
secured creditors and claims against the debtor’s estate (claims that arose after the commencement 
of the insolvency proceedings) have been satisfied in full. See, for example, Douglas G. Baird & 
Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U CHI. L. 
REV. 738, 738 & n. 1 (1988) (discussing the origins of the absolute priority rule in American law). 
Of course, variations of this ordering occur by virtue of national policy choices, but absent an 
affirmative pronouncement of national law, generally all claims—including employee claims—are 
unsecured. 
14  Id. See also Guarantee Mandate arts. 2(4), 11. 
15  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7(i) (noting that the Member State of the opening of main 
proceedings supplies the governing law for priorities and the ranking of claims). 
16  See Guarantee Mandate art. 9; E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7. The E.U. Regulation provides 
the general choice of law rule for insolvency proceedings, and the Guarantee Mandate provides for 
which guarantee fund pays an employee’s claim, but it is possible under these provisions for those 
bodies of law to be different. 
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two States can lead to a vastly different outcome for employee-claimants that are 
identically situated but for the State in which their employer is headquartered.17  
The E.U. Regulation’s provision for the law of the State of the primary 
insolvency proceeding to control the insolvency process can lead to vastly 
different distributional outcomes for employees in non-main jurisdictions.18 This 
counterintuitive treatment of employee claims can operate to defeat the purpose 
of the policy choices that Member States make as to the proper level of protection 
due employee claims, expressed via the outlet for national law incorporated into 
the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate.19 If a Member State determines 
that employees are entitled to a priority under domestic law, they are no less 
worthy of that protection simply because their employer is headquartered 
abroad.20 As such, harmonizing the goal of the Guarantee Mandate with the 
procedure and choice of law provisions of the E.U. Regulation can be 
accomplished by a change in the procedure Member States’ guarantee funds 
follow when satisfying employee claims. 
Instead of having the guarantee funds simply pay a fixed amount, leaving the 
balance of an employee’s claim to be satisfied in part, if at all, in the primary 
                                                 
17  To wit, when an employee in a priority-granting State possesses a residual claim (that is, a claim that 
is not fully satisfied by the insurance fund and the assets located domestically) against the debtor, 
and the debtor’s assets are subject to an insolvency proceeding in a non-priority State, the balance 
of the employee’s claim will be governed by the non-priority legal regime. This, despite the fact that 
an identically-situated employee of a domestic company would have the full value of her claim 
governed by the priority-granting domestic law. 
18  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 3(1) (“In the case of a company . . . the place of the registered 
office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the 
contrary.”). In the United States, an analogous concept is the “nerve center” test that indicates the 
proper court for jurisdiction over a corporation. See, for example, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 
(2010). 
19  Neither the E.U. Regulation nor the Guarantee Mandate operates to prohibit Member States from 
enacting “hybrid” priority-guarantee regimes, and Member States are likewise able to enact 
guarantee regimes that provide greater protection for employee claims than the minimum. 
However, when operating together, these policy choices can be frustrated by an inconsistent change 
in the applicable law. 
20  The two major areas in which employment research is being conducted appear to be temporary 
relocation of employees (so-called “posted” workers) within the E.U. and labor mobility; 
quantitative measures of the prevalence of companies employing workers in foreign companies (to 
staff the companies’ operations in that foreign company) does not appear to be an area to which 
international study has been directed. Cf, for example, Roberto Pedersini & Massimo Pallini, Posted 
Workers in the European Union, EURO. FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING 
CONDITIONS (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork 
 /comparative-information/posted-workers-in-the-european-union; Labor Mobility Within the E.U., 
EURO. COMM’N (Sept. 25, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-541_en.htm. 
There is a wealth of data available on the pertinent economic characteristics of the employee’s side 
of the E.U.’s economic equation, but, alas, there is little data available concerning the employer’s 
side. See EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT (LABOUR FORCE SURVEY), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/web/lfs/data/database (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
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insolvency proceeding, this Comment argues that Member States should employ 
a dynamic approach to protecting employee claims in insolvency proceedings. 
Under such an approach, guarantee funds would pay employee claims at the level 
to which they would be entitled if the insolvency proceeding were being wholly 
administered in domestic courts and subject to domestic law. The guarantee fund 
would become subrogated to the employee’s claim against the debtor, and the 
employee could still lodge a claim for any residual amount of their claim that was 
not paid out of the debtor’s local assets and the guarantee fund payments. As a 
result, the amount of the claim against the debtor would not change, it would just 
be bifurcated into two sub-types: (1) claims lodged by the guarantee funds, having 
become subrogated to the original employee claim; and (2) deficiency claims 
lodged by employees. The guarantee fund lodging the subrogated claim in the 
primary insolvency proceeding would receive the amount to which the employee 
would have been entitled, which would defray the payment the fund made to the 
employee in the first place. This method would protect all employee claims to the 
fullest extent that Member States deem prudent, fully expressing their chosen 
policy judgments by eliminating the disparity visited upon employees based solely 
on where their employer is headquartered.21 
This procedural change would result in the realization of several benefits that 
more fully achieve the motivating goals of the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee 
Mandate in the first place, gains which form the ultimate focus of this Comment. 
Member States will more fully realize the policy choices they make as to the 
appropriate level of protection for employees of insolvent firms, while at the same 
time fully internalizing the costs of their policy choices rather than imposing 
externalities on other parties.22 Finally, Member States will be better able to 
apportion those costs how they see fit: either spreading them across the national 
economy as a whole or apportioning the costs by industry according to the 
Member State’s assessment of the riskiness of each industry.23 
In Section II, this Comment will frame the issue considered herein and set 
out the relevant changes incorporated in the E.U. Regulation as informed by the 
Guarantee Mandate. Section III will show that the Guarantee Mandate allows for 
an important outlet for national policy choices in the E.U.-wide insolvency regime. 
                                                 
21  This is so because, instead of some subset of employee claims receiving less protection than the 
Member States had previously determined they warranted, all employee claims would receive the 
level of protection they would receive under domestic law.  
22  See infra Section IV(B). 
23  See infra Section IV(B). As a matter of first impression, it appears that the apportioned approach 
that takes account of the riskiness of individual industries would be preferable as a means of 
requiring firms within each industry to internalize (and thus account for) the risk that they will 
become insolvent and impose costs on their employees, some of the most vulnerable stakeholders 
in the enterprise. However, this assessment of the optimal means of allocating the costs of 
guaranteeing employee claims in insolvency is outside the scope of this Comment, and perhaps a 
valuable subject for future analysis. 
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The E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate operate in some cases to 
increase the protection of employees when firms become insolvent. However, 
certain elements of the E.U. Member States’ national insolvency regimes can, 
when coupled with the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law provisions, lead to 
employees of companies with foreign headquarters receiving disparate treatment 
relative to employees of domestic firms. In Section IV the Comment advances 
that a change in the way the Guarantee Mandate is implemented by Member States 
is necessary in order to eliminate the disparate effects that the E.U. Regulation’s 
choice of law provisions can have when claims from Member States with one 
particular approach to protecting employees in insolvency are administered by 
courts in Member States with differing approaches. It is argued that this change 
will more effectively express the Member States’ policy choices, more fully align 
the costs of policy choices with their selection and implementation, and increase 
the gains to efficiency sought by the E.U.’s regulatory scheme in the first instance. 
Section V briefly concludes. 
II.  FRAMING THE PROBLEM :  THE E.U.  REGULATION AND THE 
GUARANTEE MANDATE 
This Section will discuss the development of the E.U.-wide insolvency 
regime consisting of the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate, with a brief 
consideration of the historical origins of these pronouncements, before turning to 
the interaction between the two laws and the harmful effects that can result from 
their different approaches to the choice of law problem. Throughout it will be 
shown that the unique situation of employees in the cross-border insolvency 
regime justify the revision of Member States’ implementation of the Guarantee 
Mandate in order to mitigate the harsh impacts that changing national laws would 
otherwise have. 
A.  Cross-Border Insolvency: A Brief Conceptual History 
In a single-State insolvency, the legal differences between States would 
matter little—it is easy to imagine that a State’s insolvency regime would be one 
of the factors a firm considered when deciding whether to conduct business 
there—and choice of law issues would not arise.24 Coordinating the proceedings 
                                                 
24  See, for example, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991) (“The founders and managers of a firm . . . . choose where to incorporate 
(states have different legal rules).”). See also id. at 5–6 (“Managers in the United States must select 
the place of incorporation . . . The managers who pick the state of incorporation that is most 
desirable from the perspective of investors will attract the most money.”). Judge Easterbrook and 
Professor Fischel deal with United States corporate law, but it is a general proposition of a 
conceptualization of the market for corporate law that the founders of corporations are rational 
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becomes significantly more complex, however, when more than one body of law 
is, or could be, applicable. Because insolvency law is primarily a State-level regime, 
no two insolvency regimes are precisely the same.25 Differences in national 
insolvency regimes become important in at least two increasingly common 
situations. 
1. The archetypal cross-border insolvency. 
First, in situations where multinational firms have assets located in foreign 
States, it is not immediately clear what body of law should govern in an eventual 
insolvency proceeding.26 Where a firm is headquartered in one State and 
significant assets exist elsewhere, the law that actually governs the insolvency 
proceedings in the foreign States could plausibly be the law of the State in which 
the assets are located27 or the law of the State of the debtor’s headquarters.28 
Second, a similar situation exists where a business entity has creditors in 
multiple States. In these situations, the possibility exists that insolvency 
proceedings may be instituted in any number of viable (if not strictly convenient) 
fora, including the State of the debtor’s headquarters or any of the States in which 
the creditors are principally located.29 In both situations, the court reviewing the 
insolvency petition must determine the law to apply, which can have profound 
effects on the eventual distribution of assets to the creditors.30 
                                                 
actors, evaluating, among other things, the legal regime under which they would be incorporating. 
This does not change if the relevant choices for incorporation are States rather than U.S. states. 
25  See generally, for example, José M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional Question in 
International Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459 (2011) (discussing the wide variety of differences in 
policy choices in international insolvency regimes). The E.U. Regulation is one example of attempts 
made by the international community to respond to the increasingly globalized marketplace, and 
the issues it poses for a legal regime primarily located at the national level. 
26  See JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, CHARLES D. BOOTH, CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS & HARRY RAJAK, A 
GLOBAL VIEW OF BUSINESS INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 227–28 (2010). 
27  See, for example, Jeremy Goldring, Priorities and Set-Offs, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY 515–24, 516. 
This is termed the lex situs. Id. 
28  Id. at 515–16. This is termed the lex fori. Id. 
29  The E.U. Regulation attempts to curtail some of the potential for gamesmanship by providing that, 
in the case of a legal person, the COMI, and thus the appropriate venue for the main insolvency 
proceeding, is the place of registered office. See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 3(1). It should be 
noted, however, that this rule can be rebutted, and the lex situs still applies in certain specific 
instances. For example, lex situs applies in the case of contracts relating to immovable property and 
rights subject to registration (e.g., aircraft and ships). See id. at arts. 3(1), (11), (14). Indeed, the E.U. 
Regulation indicates that the prevention of forum shopping by shifting assets between jurisdictions 
is one of the main motivating factors behind having an E.U.-wide insolvency regime. See id. at 
pmbl.(5). 
30  SARRA STUDY, supra note 4. It is also useful to note that, generally speaking, parties to a contract 
have the ability to agree as to which jurisdiction’s laws shall govern the rights under that contract. 
In the E.U., such agreements are allowed for most contracts, excluding certain “consumer 
contracts.” See Axel Gehringer, After Carnival Cruise and Sky Reefer: An Analysis of Forum Selection 
Clauses in Maritime and Aviation Transactions, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 633, 678–79 (2001) (citing 
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In the above situations, then, the choice of law rule is important primarily 
because the governing law largely determines the outcome of the insolvency 
distribution.31 The fact that insolvency regimes are primarily a matter of national 
policy choices means that determinations of national social and economic policy, 
historical developments, and even the basic structure of the national institutions 
can drastically affect the resulting insolvency regime.32 
2. Territoriality and universality—two major approaches to cross-
border insolvency. 
When faced with multi-jurisdictional insolvencies, courts have historically 
approached this issue in two major ways.33 The first is to treat the assets in each 
State as subject to the operation of that State’s laws. This “territoriality” doctrine 
holds that courts of one State have jurisdiction only over those assets located 
within the State.34 This necessarily means that a State’s court has jurisdiction only 
over assets located within that State, and thus a creditor seeking satisfaction from 
all of the debtor’s assets must lodge claims in all States in which the debtor’s assets 
are located. 35 
The other major approach has been to treat the assets of the debtor, 
wherever located, as controlled by the laws of the State administering the 
insolvency proceedings.36 This “universality” doctrine holds that the State most 
competent to administer the insolvency is that in which the firm is 
headquartered.37 
As international trade became more complex, and cross-border commerce 
more prevalent, cross-border insolvencies administered under the “pure” 
territoriality and “pure” universality doctrines became less practical, and the desire 
for change prompted various iterations of what eventually became known as the 
                                                 
Convention Concerning Judicial Competence and the Execution of Decisions in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 20747). The Convention Gehringer cites has 
been updated substantially since its initial conclusion, and the new E.U. regulations governing 
forum selection clauses are found in various articles of Chapter II of the 2012 recast of the Brussels 
I Regulation. See Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU). 
31  See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4. 
32  See generally SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 3–130. See also id. at 126–30 (noting the variety of different 
policy justifications that lead States to customize their insolvency regime differently along a number 
of axes ranging from the precise protections afforded employees, the methods of providing funding 
for those protections, and the extent to which directors and officers of the debtor are held liable 
for those claims, to name a few). 
33  See, for example, WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 229–31. 
34  See, for example, Garrido, supra note 25 at 467. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. at 468. 
37  Id. at 471–72. 
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“modified universalism” doctrine.38 This approach attempts to accommodate 
local interests in the insolvency process while still reaping some of the efficiency 
benefits that centralized insolvency administration can produce.39 Modified 
universalism has been the theoretical approach employed most often in the 
international community’s attempts at harmonizing the disparate insolvency 
regimes of the various States engaged in high volumes of international trade.40 
B.  The Development of the E.U. Regulation 
The E.U. Regulation was not the first attempt at harmonizing disparate State 
laws pertaining to insolvency. The first developments in international insolvency 
rulemaking were the International Bar Association’s Cross-Border Insolvency 
Concordat, its predecessor, the Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act 
(MIICA), and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.41 The E.U. Regulation 
embraces the modified universality approach in an attempt to harmonize the 
insolvency regimes of its Member States while still respecting the sovereignty 
Member States reserve over areas of national policy.42 
1. The adoption of the E.U. Regulation. 
The E.U. initially incorporated the UNCITRAL Model Law into E.U. law 
on May 29, 2000.43 The E.U. sought to establish an E.U.-wide regime designed to 
promote uniformity and stability among the E.U. Member States.44 
                                                 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 471 (“‘Modified Universalism’ is an accepted term . . . that refers to a universalist approach in 
which some concessions are made to territorial interests for the sake of ensuring the effective 
functioning of the international insolvency system.”). 
40  See generally E.U. Regulation, supra note 1. 
41  International Bar Association, Section on Business Law, Committee J-Insolvency and Creditors’ 
Rights, Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (1996), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/ 
Default.aspx?DocumentUid=2d55e76f-cab1-493d-b0a9-4b4b967b353f; Comm. J, Sec. on Bus. L., 
Int’l Bar Ass’n., Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (1988), reprinted in Timothy E. 
Powers, The Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act: A 21st Century Proposal for International 
Insolvency Co-operation, AA-1–AA-16 in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MULTINATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY (1993); G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (1998) [Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law]. 
42  See, for example, Garrido, supra note 25 at 472. 
43  The E.C. Regulation was enacted with the stated goal of creating a scheme that is “binding and 
directly applicable,” “[i]n order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects.” E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (8). 
44  The E.C. Regulation largely followed the Model Law’s structure and principles, with the primary 
difference between the two being “the operative framework of the [E.C. Regulation]; specifically[ 
that] the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has authority to issue [binding rulings], which allows for 
harmonization on many of the points of law—particularly determination of COMI issues—when 
the domestic courts applying the [E.C. Regulation] come to inconsistent results.” Anthony V. 
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To that end, the E.U. enacted the E.U. Regulation.45 The E.U. Regulation 
was enacted following a 2012 report on the effectiveness of the E.C. Regulation.46 
The majority of the E.U. Regulation’s provisions are set to enter into force on 
June 26, 2017.47 The most significant changes included in the E.U. Regulation are 
the addition of provisions dealing with coordinating multi-entity insolvencies, and 
so-called “undertakings,” which allow the primary insolvency administrator to 
offer informal settlements to creditors in secondary locations in order to 
streamline the aggregation of the debtor’s assets in the primary insolvency 
proceeding.48 
Though these added provisions aim to increase the administrative efficiency 
of cross-border insolvencies, they focus chiefly on streamlining the consolidation 
of assets into the primary proceeding and handling multi-entity insolvency 
proceedings more efficiently.49 They do not squarely address the challenges faced 
by employee creditors in navigating the disparate insolvency regimes that exist 
throughout the E.U. 
The changes incorporated in the E.U. Regulation are largely intended to 
address the proliferation of insolvencies with cross-border characteristics. As 
several commentators have noted, however, the operation of insolvency law is 
particularly important to one class of creditors—the employees—given their 
unique position relative to the debtor.50 It is important to view the changes 
                                                 
Sexton, Current Problems and Trends in the Administration of Transnational Insolvencies Involving Enterprise 
Groups: The Mixed Record of Protocols, the UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law, and the EU Insolvency 
Regulation, 12 U. CHI. J. INT’L L. 811, 831–32 (2012). 
45  See generally, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1. 
46  See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings, COM (2012) 743 final (Dec. 12, 2012). 
47  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 92 (noting, however, that certain articles therein will have different 
effective dates. These articles generally relate to the sharing of information regarding insolvencies 
within Member States’ territories, and are not of particular relevance for present purposes.). 
48  Id. arts. 36, 56–83. 
49  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (3), (42), (51). 
50  See, for example, WESTBROOK, supra note 26 at 184 (2010) (“There can be little doubt that the overall 
effect on employees and their families is qualitatively far worse than it is on other creditors.”); Janis 
Sarra, An Investigation Into Employee Wage and Pension Claims in Insolvency Proceedings Across Multiple 
Jurisdictions: Preliminary Observations, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 Art. 8, 1 (2007) (“Employees are 
seriously affected by firm financial failure. Wages, vacation pay, expense claims, termination, and 
severance pay are frequently claims outstanding at the point of commercial insolvency . . . . 
Employees face information asymmetries; hence they are often the last creditors to know of the 
company’s financial distress and the least able to protect themselves in advance from the losses 
associated with firm failure.”). The unique situation in which employees are placed when their 
employer becomes insolvent—and their unique characteristics relative to other stakeholders in the 
insolvency process—warrants the change in implementation argued for here. 
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incorporated into the E.U. Regulation, and the provisions left unchanged, in light 
of their effects on the claims of this especially vulnerable subset of creditors.51 
The E.U. Regulation, as indicated above, seeks to streamline cross-border 
insolvencies, reduce gamesmanship and forum-shopping, and improve the 
efficiency of the proceedings.52 However, in allowing for the application of one 
State’s laws to the vast majority of potential claims against a debtor, the claims of 
foreign employees can fall through the cracks during the transition from one State 
to another.53 Likewise, even under two regimes that grant a priority to employee 
claims, an employee that has been partially satisfied out of the assets in their home 
State is likely to not be advantaged by the priority afforded their claims in the main 
insolvency proceeding, given the high variability of national insolvency regimes 
and the pari passu rule contained in the E.U. Regulation.54 
The reason that employee-claimants are still faced with challenges in 
securing satisfaction of their claims is illustrated by Sections 66 and 72 of the 
Preamble to the E.U. Regulation.55 For insolvency proceedings governed by the 
E.U. Regulation, the Member State opening insolvency proceedings provides the 
controlling body of law.56 In certain circumstances, the E.U. Regulation permits 
challenges to the opening of a main insolvency proceeding.57 Nevertheless, absent 
an upheld challenge, the opening of a main insolvency proceeding by a national 
court can lock in the body of law applicable to the case, having profound effects 
on the final distribution of the debtor’s assets.58 
Further, though the E.U. Regulation provides for a general choice of law 
rule, there are certain exceptions that permit other nations’ laws to apply, primarily 
                                                 
51  See WESTBROOK, supra note 26 at 183–86. 
52  See note 43 supra and accompanying text. See also, for example, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. 
(5). 
53  WESTBROOK, supra note 26 at 192–94. 
54  See E.U. Regulation  art. 23 (Also known as the “hotch pot” rule, the pari passu rule provides that 
creditors that have obtained some payment of their claim in the course of insolvency proceedings 
“shall share in distributions made in other proceedings only where creditors of the same ranking . . . 
have . . . obtained an equivalent dividend.”). 
55  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (66), (72). 
56  Id. art. 3. See also id. art. 7 (delineating the applicable body of law in particular situations, including 
“the rules governing the distribution of proceeds from the realisation of assets[ and] the ranking of 
claims”). The determination of the appropriate Member State to open proceedings is provided for 
generally in Article 3 of the E.U. Regulation. Id. art. 3. 
57  Id. arts. 3–5. To wit, the debtor or a creditor may challenge the opening based on a lack of 
international jurisdiction as defined in Article 3 of the E.U. Regulation, or on other grounds if 
provided for by national law Id. Third parties may also challenge the opening “where national law 
so provides.” Id. art. 5(2). 
58  See notes 3 & 4, supra and accompanying text. It is also useful to note that courts presented with a 
request to open insolvency proceedings are to examine sua sponte whether jurisdiction under Article 
3 of the E.U. Regulation does in fact exist so as to make opening the proceedings proper thereunder. 
E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 4. 
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to components of the insolvency case considered uniquely national, and thus 
properly governed by the law applicable from the origination of the right, 
including, for example, rights in rem and contracts relating to immovable 
property.59 Contracts of employment are likewise governed by the law applicable 
to the contract, even if it is not the law of the State opening the main insolvency 
proceeding.60 However, employee claims brought under these contracts are still 
governed by the law of the primary insolvency proceeding State, even if the 
employment contract was governed by a different body of law.61 This means that, 
for any given employee in any given E.U. Member State, the law by which their 
claims for past due wages, pension payments, paid leave, or other such payments 
is governed could be vastly different than another employee identically-situated 
save for their employer’s headquarters.62 
a) Consistencies between the E.C. and E.U. Regulations. When analyzing the E.U. 
Regulation’s effect on employee claims, it is first useful to take note of the relevant 
provisions of the E.C. Regulation that have carried over in more or less the same 
form to the E.U. Regulation, as these key provisions set the stage for the 
implementation problems that bear heavily on employee claims in the insolvency 
administration process.63 
Section 63 of the E.U. Regulation’s Preamble, corresponding with Section 
21 of the E.C. Regulation’s Preamble, provides that  
[a]ny creditor which has its habitual residence, domicile or registered office in 
the Union should have the right to lodge its claims in each of the insolvency 
proceedings pending in the Union relating to the debtor’s assets . . . Every 
creditor should be able to keep what it has received in the course of 
insolvency proceedings, but should be entitled only to participate in the 
distribution of total assets in other proceedings if creditors with the same 
standing have obtained the same proportion of their claims.64 
This language as implemented in the operative provisions of the E.U. 
Regulation, makes clear that creditors may assert their claims against the debtor in 
any other proceeding the debtor is subject to, but they take of those distributions 
only insofar as other creditors of the same “ranking or category” have already 
reached the same proportion of satisfaction of their claims (the so-called pari 
passu or “hotch pot rule”).65 
                                                 
59  Id. arts. 8, 11. 
60  Id. pmbl. (72), art. 13. 
61  Id. pmbl. (72), arts. 7, 13. 
62  This flows directly from the choice of law provision of Article 9 of the E.U. Regulation. 
63  Cf. E.U. Regulation supra note 1 at Annex D (noting the correlation between the provisions of the 
E.U. Regulation and the EC Regulation). 
64  Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (63), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (21). 
65  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 23, 45, 53–55. 
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The E.U. Regulation likewise contains the same language as the E.C. 
Regulation regarding the choice of law rules to be applied.66 The choice of law 
articles of each Regulation are substantively identical, and both provide that the 
law of the jurisdiction opening proceedings  shall be “the law applicable to 
insolvency proceedings and their effects.”67 Of particular relevance here, both 
Regulations provide that the law of the opening jurisdiction shall provide “the 
rules governing the distribution of proceeds from the realization of assets, the 
ranking of claims and the rights of creditors who have obtained partial satisfaction 
after the opening of insolvency proceedings by virtue of a right in rem or through 
a set-off.”68 
Another holdover from the E.C. Regulation is the treatment of employee 
claims in the explicit terms of the Regulations, adding further context to the 
Regulations’ choice of law provisions.69 Contracts of employment are excluded 
from the choice of law provision that consolidates the law governing the 
insolvency proceedings in most other circumstances.70 Thus, employment 
contracts are governed by the body of law that would govern them outside of 
insolvency “in accordance with the general rules on conflict of laws.”71 Both 
Regulations, however, provide that “[a]ny other questions relating to the law of 
insolvency, such as whether the employees’ claims are protected by preferential 
rights and the status such preferential rights may have, should be determined by 
the law of the Member State in which the insolvency proceedings (main or 
secondary) have been opened.”72 
b) New additions to the E.U. Regulation. The E.U. Regulation also incorporates 
several notable departures from the E.C. Regulation’s language.73 One major 
update is the inclusion of Chapter V.74 Chapter V addresses the unique issues 
posed by multi-entity insolvencies, in particular making detailed provision for 
communication and cooperation between the courts administering the various 
interrelated proceedings.75 Chapter V Section 2 in particular sets out the 
procedures for the institution of group coordination proceedings, and the duties 
of the coordinator appointed to harmonize the operations of the various 
proceedings.76 Specific provision is made for several “tasks and rights” to vest in 
                                                 
66  Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (66), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (23) 
67  Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7(1), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 4(1). 
68  Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7(2)(i), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 4(2)(i). 
69  Compare E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 4, with E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7. 
70  Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (72), with E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (28). 
71  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (72), art. 13(1).  
72  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (72). See also E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 pmbl. (28). 
73  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 at Annex D. 
74  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 56–77. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. arts. 61–77. 
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the coordinator, including the right to be heard and participate in any of the 
proceedings opened in respect to any member of the enterprise group, and the 
task of “propos[ing] a group coordination plan that identifies, describes and 
recommends a comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated 
approach to the resolution of the group members’ insolvencies.”77  
The next major change incorporated into the E.U. Regulation is the 
“undertaking” framework of Article 36.78 The main insolvency administrator, in 
order to streamline the insolvency process, is allowed a means by which to attempt 
to prevent the institution of secondary proceedings.79 The main insolvency 
administrator can enter into an agreement with the creditors likely to institute 
secondary proceedings that, when distributing the assets from the secondary 
location, the primary insolvency administrator will comply with the “distribution 
and priority rights under national law that creditors would have if secondary 
insolvency proceedings were opened in that Member State.”80 
Another innovation found in the E.U. Regulation is the expansion of  
cooperation and coordination provisions between insolvency administrators and 
courts in the various jurisdictions in which the debtor has assets.81 Combined with 
Chapter IV’s information disclosure provisions, this evidences an interest in 
increasing the opportunities and abilities of the various stakeholders in the 
insolvency administration to coordinate the insolvency proceedings as efficiently 
as possible.82 The E.C. Regulation had somewhat similar language, most notably 
the provision for the right of “any creditor who has his habitual residence, 
domicile, or registered office in a Member State” to lodge a claim in any insolvency 
proceeding governed by the Regulations.83 However, the E.U. Regulation’s 
Chapter IV provides a more expansive allowance for the right to bring claims, 
extending the right to “[a]ny foreign creditor.”84 Chapter IV further provides for 
a standardized form and language accommodations that purport to make it easier 
for foreign claimants to lodge their claims in other insolvency proceedings.85 
2. Primary approaches to employee protection. 
Though most E.U. Member States afford special protection to employees in 
insolvency proceedings, the precise methods and procedures can differ widely 
                                                 
77  Id. art. 72. 
78  Id. art. 36. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. art. 36. 
81  Id. arts. 41–44. 
82  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 53–55. 
83  Compare E.C. Regulation, supra note 6 art. 39, with E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 53. 
84  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 53. 
85  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 54(3), 55(1). 
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from State to State.86 In the international community generally, there are three 
major approaches to handling the claims of employees of the debtor firm currently 
in use. First, some States afford employee claims some manner of priority in the 
insolvency distribution process.87 As one commentator noted, “The underlying 
policy rationale . . . is frequently that employees are considered particularly 
vulnerable claimants and a statutory priority offers them some limited relief from 
losses incurred due to their employer’s insolvency.”88 The second major approach 
is to provide for guarantee funds or insurance schemes, which operate to at least 
partially insulate employees from the full brunt of the employer’s insolvency and 
the detrimental effects it can have on their income.89 The rationale here, as one 
commentator notes, “is that such funds guarantee payments to workers when they 
are most vulnerable and can be far more expeditious than recovery after a 
bankrupt estate has been liquidated and payments made to creditors.”90 The last 
major approach is an amalgamation of both approaches. Under the hybrid 
approaches, some form of creditor priority is combined with some form of 
guarantee or insurance fund, often with a resulting subrogation of the guarantee 
fund to the employee’s claim in the insolvency proceeding.91 The rationale behind 
the hybrid approach is that “both strategies are needed to protect employees and 
to create the appropriate incentives for director and officer conduct in the period 
leading up to the business enterprise entering insolvency proceedings.”92  
In one of the few, and most extensive, studies on the subject, Professor Sarra 
observed that, of the sixty-two States surveyed, the most common schemes were 
the hybrid system and the preference system, with the hybrid system being 
employed by twenty-nine of the States surveyed, and the preference system in use 
by twenty-six States.93 In contrast, the pure guarantee fund approach, without 
some form of preference in liquidation, was employed by only five States.94 
Within these broad categories, States can differ widely in the precise 
approach taken. For example, as between States in the priority-granting category, 
the exact ordering of the priority and the types and amounts of the priority can 
                                                 
86  See generally Janis Sarra, An Investigation into Employee Wage and Pension Claims in Insolvency Proceedings 
Across Multiple Jurisdictions: Preliminary Observations, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 Art. 8 (2007). 
87  SARRA STUDY, supra note 4 at 9. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  See id. at 9–10. 
92  Id. at 10. 
93  SARRA STUDY, supra note 4 at 10–11 & graph 1. 
94  Id. Of particular interest here, Austria and Germany are among the minority of Member States that 
have a purely guarantee fund protection scheme, though, as with all comparisons that can be drawn, 
even within this relatively small subset of the survey, the precise details of the States’ approaches 
vary. Id. at 35–41. 
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differ to a large extent.95 Likewise, between States with some form of guarantee 
fund, the exact types of employee claims, the caps imposed on guarantee 
payments, and other such variables can differ between States.96  
Another means by which States can differ is in how they fund their guarantee 
funds.97 There are two major approaches to funding the guarantee funds: (1) 
general taxation, spreading the costs throughout the national economy as a whole, 
and (2) a levy on the business that operate in the State, including, in numerous 
cases, apportioning the necessary levies “based on the risks inherent in the 
particular sector or industry.”98 
C. A More Direct Approach to Employee Protection: The 
Guarantee Mandate  
On October 22, 2008, the E.U. enacted the Guarantee Mandate.99 The 
Guarantee Mandate requires Member States to provide guarantee funds that 
ensure a minimum level of protection for employees in the event that their 
employer becomes insolvent.100 The Guarantee Mandate permits Member States 
to set higher levels of protections and to establish (or maintain) a priority for 
employee claims in addition to guarantee funds.101 Indeed, the European Court of 
Justice, albeit operating under the original 1980 Directive, has indicated that 
Member States are liable for the guarantee of employee claims even if they have 
not transposed the Directive into their national laws.102 Thus, the Guarantee 
Mandate has had the effect of requiring all Member States to have either a “pure 
guarantee” regime or a “hybrid” guarantee/priority regime for protecting 
                                                 
95  Id. at 18 (noting that “one can construct a matrix of the types of priorities or preferences for wage 
and related claims,” and that such a matrix would include categories like an absolute priority even 
over secured creditors, priority alongside administrative costs, priority only over unsecured 
creditors, and even priority divided up by the time frame over which the claims were alleged to have 
accrued). 
96  Id. at 34 (noting that a variety of approaches to the guarantee fund are employed, including varying 
levels of monetary caps (a number of times corresponding “in some measure to the amount of 
priority granted such claims,”) and imposing timeframe limits on how far back claims would be 
guaranteed). 
97  Id. at 34, 35. 
98  Id. 
99  See generally Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7. 
100  See id. arts. 3, 4. 
101  See id. art. 11. See also Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and Wage Claims 
in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries: Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the 
United States, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 867, 903 (2014) (“This directive sets a minimum standard in 
all E.U. countries . . . but it does not prevent higher protection for employee claims in these 
situations.”). 
102  See Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-5403 ¶¶ 15, 46. 
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employee claims, as the “pure priority” regime is no longer permitted under the 
Guarantee Mandate.103 
Article 3 of the Guarantee Mandate provides that “Member States shall take 
measures necessary to ensure that guarantee institutions guarantee, subject to 
Article 4, payment of employees’ outstanding claims resulting from contracts of 
employment . . . including, where provided for by national law, severance pay on 
termination of employment relationships.”104 Article 4 allows Member States to 
limit the extent to which the guarantee fund insures employee claims either by 
time period or amount ceilings.105 However, any time period is required to be 
accompanied by a particular reference period depending on the timeframe limit 
imposed, and any amount ceiling “must not fall below a level which is socially 
compatible with the social objective of [the] Directive.”106 
The Guarantee Mandate further provides that the two main methods of 
funding guarantee funds—a tax on the whole economy or a levy on the firms 
doing business in the Member States—are permissible options for Member 
States.107 The Guarantee Mandate further provides, however, that “the assets of 
the institutions must be independent of the employers’ operating capital and be 
inaccessible to proceedings for insolvency . . . [and] the institutions’ liabilities must 
not depend on whether or not obligations to contribute to financing have been 
fulfilled.”108 
The Guarantee Mandate also contains specific provisions for cross-border 
insolvencies.109 Article 9 provides that the guarantee fund responsible for paying 
employee claims is that “in the Member State in whose territory they work or 
habitually work,” and further that “[t]he extent of employees’ rights shall be 
determined by the law governing the competent guarantee institution.”110 
At bottom, then, the Guarantee Mandate requires Member States to provide 
for a minimal level of protection for employee wage claims.111 The amount and 
method of calculation of the payments to which employees are entitled are 
governed by the law of the State in which the employee works, and the employees 
are protected from a reduction in payments if the funds have not been fully 
                                                 
103  See generally Guarantee Mandate supra note 7. Indeed, under the European Court of Justice’s 
precedent, it appears that if Member States are unwilling to implement the Guarantee Mandate, 
employees and the courts could constructively force them to anyway by holding the Member States 
liable for the amount of the guarantee payment. 
104  Id. art. 3. 
105  Id. art. 4. 
106  Id. art. 4(3). 
107  Guarantee Mandate supra note 7 art. 5. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. art. 9. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. pmbl. (3), art. 4. 
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implemented or financed.112 However, the Guarantee Mandate still allows 
Member States a significant amount of latitude to customize their 
implementations of the Mandate, including the precise amounts and time periods 
of payments to guarantee and the method of funding the guarantee fund.113 
Though a significant step forward in ensuring the protection of employee 
claims in insolvency—and, indeed, a clear codification of the gravity with which 
the E.U. views the plight of the employee in cross-border insolvencies—the 
interaction with the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law provisions can nevertheless 
lead to disparate outcomes for employee claims in cases involving one or more 
Member States, especially in cases involving fundamentally different approaches 
to structuring insolvency regimes, but even in cases with differences so slight as 
differing approaches to priority regimes.114 
D.  Constructing the Framework 
Because of the unique positioning of employees in cross-border insolvencies 
and the emphasis that E.U. law places upon employee protection, the situation of 
interest here is the following: what happens when a firm is headquartered in a 
particular E.U. Member State, but conducts business operations in a number of 
other E.U. Member States before becoming insolvent? If an employee works for 
the debtor firm in one State, but the assets in that State are insufficient to satisfy 
the employee’s claims, the employee can lodge a claim for the balance in the State 
where the primary insolvency proceeding is being conducted.115 However, the 
precise approaches to protecting employee claims differ widely from State to 
State.116 For example, if a French employee of a German company has to lodge a 
residual wage claim in the primary insolvency proceeding, their claim will receive 
no priority under the German insolvency regime.117 However, their next door 
neighbor, a French employee of a French company, identical in every way but for 
the nationality of their employer, would receive a priority for their residual wage 
claim in the primary insolvency proceeding.118 Thus, even though E.U. Member 
States have the option to customize their national insolvency regimes according 
to their view of the appropriate level of protection to afford to employee claims, 
the structure of the E.U.-wide law in this area means that a subset of the priority-
granting State’s workforce (those employees working for foreign corporations 
                                                 
112  Id. arts. 3–5. 
113  Id. arts. 4–5. 
114  See, generally, SARRA STUDY, supra note 4. 
115  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45 (“Any creditor may lodge its claim in the main insolvency 
proceedings and in any secondary insolvency proceedings.”). 
116  SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
117  Id. at 237–38, 249–50. 
118  Id. at 237–38.  
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headquartered in non-priority-granting States) is not receiving the level of 
protection that State has determined is necessary. Moreover, the determinant of 
this disparate outcome is simply where the  employer is headquartered.119 
1. The detrimental interaction between the E.U. Regulation and the 
Guarantee Mandate. 
In order to develop a solution to this disparate treatment, it is important to 
ask precisely what provisions of the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate 
operate to this effect. 
The Guarantee Mandate allows Member States to determine how strongly 
to protect employees of insolvent companies.120 It also permits them to determine 
the particular types of claims, time periods, and monetary amounts of claims to 
guarantee.121 Though allowing for an important outlet for Member States’ national 
policy choices regarding the proper amount of protection for employee claims, 
the Guarantee Mandate nevertheless imports national law into the E.U.-wide 
insolvency regime in a way that effectively creates another exception to the choice 
of law provisions of the E.U. Regulation.122 The  choice of law rule, then, strips 
priority regimes from priority-granting States, and applies the priority where it is 
not recognized at domestic law. The pari passu rule  further interferes with the 
recoveries employees realize.123 
2. Concluding thoughts on the current state of the E.U. 
insolvency regime. 
Neither the E.U. Regulation nor the Guarantee Mandate alone can address 
the problems created by the interaction between the two enactments. As such, it 
is useful to draw some conclusions about the current state of affairs before 
proceeding to consider the solution advanced here. 
First, the E.U. Regulation’s provision for undertakings  will not affect cases 
in which there are sufficient assets located in the secondary jurisdiction to satisfy 
                                                 
119  This outcome obtains because the choice of law provisions in the E.U. Regulation, Article 7 are 
activated by the jurisdictional provisions of Article 3, which establishes that the debtor’s COMI is 
determinative of the proper location for the institution of primary insolvency proceedings. E.U. 
Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 3, 7. 
120  Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 arts. 2(4), 11. 
121  Id. arts. 3–8. 
122  In a world in which the law of the jurisdiction opening the main insolvency proceeding governs 
(with the exceptions created by the E.U. Regulation), providing for a guarantee fund governed by 
the law of the Member State in which the employee works creates sub silentio a new exception to the 
E.U. Regulation as to the amount guaranteed by the guarantee fund and as to those employees 
whose claims are partially satisfied thereby. 
123  See E.U. Regulation supra note 1 art. 23. 
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all claims in that jurisdiction.124 Allowing for a more streamlined distribution of 
assets located in the secondary jurisdiction benefits the insolvency proceeding as 
a whole, and to the extent that it leads to a faster satisfaction of employee claims, 
it is a useful tool for that purpose.125 However, where the secondary jurisdiction 
does not contain enough assets to satisfy all claims, the secondary jurisdiction’s 
claimants must lodge their claims in the primary insolvency proceeding, thereby 
inviting the disparate outcomes discussed here.126 
Second, the E.U. Regulation’s provision for cross-jurisdictional cooperation 
between insolvency practitioners and courts could be useful in providing more 
equitable treatment to the employee claims in the several insolvency 
proceedings.127 To the extent the various courts and insolvency practitioners can 
conclude inter-jurisdictional agreements dealing with the administration of the 
insolvency proceedings, the E.U. Regulation may resolve disparities in treatment 
of employee claims between local employees and foreign employees. However, to 
the extent transaction costs or other barriers to negotiation leave employee claims 
out of the E.U. Regulation’s coordination provisions, that such forms of 
coordination are permitted will not produce any beneficial change in the status 
and treatment of employee claims. 
Third, providing special procedures for administering multi-entity cross-
border insolvencies is not likely to benefit employees in any significant way.128 The 
only real benefits that employees might realize out of these changes to the E.U. 
Regulation are the marginal benefits that all claimants (and the debtor) will realize 
from having an insolvency proceeding that is administered more efficiently, at a 
lower cost, more expediently, or any combination of the three. Though the 
efficiency gains might have real, tangible benefits for all parties to the insolvency, 
they do not squarely address the problems that uniquely and disproportionately 
affect employee claimants, and cannot, in any event, eliminate the disparate effect 
of the E.U. Regulation’s interaction with the Guarantee Mandate.129 
                                                 
124  Where assets in the secondary jurisdiction are sufficient to satisfy the claims in that jurisdiction, the 
law of the primary jurisdiction will not come into play as to those claims in that jurisdiction. 
Following the conclusion of the distribution in the secondary jurisdiction, whether by secondary 
proceeding or by undertaking, the assets can get folded into the main insolvency proceeding. Id. 
arts. 41, 49. This situation is outside the scope of this Comment. 
125  The whole point of the inclusion of the undertaking language was to increase the efficiency of the 
insolvency administration, so to the extent it accomplishes its stated goal, the benefits definitionally 
accrue to all those with a stake in the conclusion of the insolvency proceedings by virtue of the 
faster satisfaction of claims in secondary jurisdictions, and the minimization of delays in the primary 
insolvency proceedings. 
126  See E.U. Regulation supra note 1 art. 45. 
127  See id. arts. 41, 42. 
128  Id. arts. 56–77. 
129  Cf. id. 
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To be sure, the Guarantee Mandate’s requirement that Member States satisfy 
certain minimum levels of employee claims for employees working in their 
territory likely makes employees better off than they would be in situations 
without such a guarantee fund. This is true both because of the guarantee of a 
certain minimum level of satisfaction of their claims and because of the 
expediency of the payment.130 Nevertheless, the Guarantee Mandate does not 
displace the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law provisions regarding employee claims 
in insolvency proceedings.131 As such, the Guarantee Mandate has the effect of 
making employees in priority-granting States worse off if they work for a foreign 
company headquartered in a State that grants no priority than if they worked for 
a domestic company.132 
Indeed, the component of the current legal regime that will arguably be most 
useful to employees in cross-border insolvencies is the change that is the least 
ambitious. Information asymmetry is a significant barrier to employee-claimants 
lodging claims in other insolvency proceedings in which the debtor’s assets are 
distributed.133 By providing greater information in a more useful, usable, and 
standardized form, the E.U. Regulation’s expanded information disclosure and 
notification provisions may operate to reduce the information asymmetry under 
which employee claimants often labor, if not prior to their employer entering 
insolvency, then at least during the insolvency proceedings.134 If employee-
claimants are better informed of their rights under E.U. law and the existence of 
insolvency proceedings in other Member States, they are better placed to assert 
their rights in the proper forum. 
As shown here, the changes incorporated into the E.U. Regulation, though 
likely to provide gains to the efficiency of insolvency administrations as a whole, 
will not address the disparate treatment employee-claimants face when they seek 
to have their claims satisfied in a jurisdiction with different priority schemes for 
employee claims.135 As such, a change in the way Member States discharge their 
obligations under the current legal regime is necessary to eliminate the conflict 
between the E.U. Regulation and the Guarantee Mandate’s incorporation of 
                                                 
130  See, generally, Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7. 
131  Cf., generally, id. See, also, E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7. 
132  The dynamic nature of the choice of law provisions of the E.U. Regulation, coupled with the static 
provision and implementation of the Guarantee Mandate has the effect of failing to account for the 
loss of priority in this subset of cross-border cases. Compare E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7, with 
Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 art. 9. 
133  SARRA STUDY supra note 4, at 4 (Employees “are often the last creditors to know of the company’s 
financial distress and the least able to protect themselves in advance from the losses associated with 
firm failure.”). 
134  See id. 
135  See supra Section II(B)(1)(b). 
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different bodies of law that produces unintended consequences for the very class 
of claimants these regulations were meant to protect. 
III.  ADVANCING THE SOLUTION  
As noted above, the cornerstone of the entire Regulation, the lex fori 
provision, directly imports the vast majority of a State’s insolvency law into the 
Regulation’s framework.136 As a result, the law governing the distribution of the 
debtor’s assets, in most situations and as to most claims, will be that of the State 
administering the main insolvency proceedings.137 With the incorporation of 
Article 36’s “undertakings” provision, the number of cases in which secondary 
proceedings are instituted will likely drop since an undertaking can accomplish the 
same result more efficiently and at lower cost.138 
The high degree of variability among E.U. Member States’ insolvency 
regimes can lead to perverse outcomes when the primary insolvency proceeding 
is incorporating the claims of foreign employees into a trans-national system that 
relies as heavily upon national law as does the E.U. Regulation. For employees 
going from insolvency proceedings in a priority regime to insolvency proceedings 
in a guarantee regime, lodging the balance of their claims in the guarantee regime 
proceeding can be all but futile by virtue of the pari passu rule and lack of priority 
afforded in those proceedings.139 
The solution, then, is to adjust the operation of national law in this context 
in order to eliminate the respective inconsistencies. Rather than have an 
employee’s claim be governed by multiple different bodies of law, the 
inconsistency (and thus the disparate treatment of similarly-situated employees) 
can be eliminated by changing the way Member States implement the Guarantee 
Mandate. Paying employees’ claims as if national law applied to their claim, rather 
than making a fixed payment and leaving the balance to be lodged in the main 
insolvency proceeding, will minimize the detrimental effects of the changing legal 
regime upon the employee-claimants.140 
A.  The Proposed Adjustment From the Employee’s 
Perspective 
The efficient and equitable outcome is to provide for payment of employee 
claims in two stages: first, at the outset of the debtor’s insolvency, at the minimum 
level provided by the Guarantee Mandate. This ensures the goals of the Guarantee 
Mandate are not abrogated in the hunt for precision in determining the proper 
                                                 
136  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 7. 
137  See id. art. 3. 
138  See id. art. 36. 
139  Cf. id. art. 23. 
140  Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 art. 9. 
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amounts of claims. The second payment should take place after the primary 
insolvency proceedings have had sufficient time to ascertain the scope of the 
debtor’s affairs. Given the E.U. Regulation’s provision for expanded information 
sharing and coordination among jurisdictions, the proposed change in 
implementation  is a simple matter for the guarantee fund or other competent 
authority in the secondary jurisdiction to accomplish.141 They will be able to access 
the available information on the debtor, ascertain the extent of the debtor’s assets, 
and determine what the distribution would be if the entirety of the debtor’s assets 
were governed by the secondary jurisdiction’s laws, as opposed to the primary 
jurisdiction.142 Upon making this determination, employees would receive the 
second payment, representing the difference between the amount of the first 
payment and the amount it is determined the employee would have received had 
the domestic law applied to all of the assets.143 States’ guarantee funds do not need 
to wait until the conclusion of the primary insolvency proceedings to make the 
second payment, or even to determine the appropriate value of the second 
payment, as the information sufficient to make the simulated distribution 
determination is available prior to the confirmation of insolvency plans.144 
The result of the dynamic approach argued for here is not a regime in which 
foreign employee claims are never brought in primary insolvency proceedings. 
The operation of this dynamic approach would have the guarantee fund pay the 
amount the employee could have received in a domestic insolvency proceeding, 
which still very likely would not equal the full value of the claim the employee has 
against the debtor. The difference, however, is the employee is not deciding 
whether to lodge a claim in the primary insolvency proceeding or to accept only 
the bare minimum guaranteed by the Guarantee Mandate. The employee instead 
is deciding whether or not to lodge that claim and go to the expense of seeing the 
primary insolvency proceeding through to the end. It may very well be that more 
employees decide that taking what they could have received in a domestic 
proceeding is better than going to the extra expense of raising the claims in foreign 
courts. 
B.  The Proposed Adjustment  from the Guarantee  
Fund’s Perspective 
The dynamic approach to satisfying employee claims would have 
justifications and effects in two chronological segments: (1) before the insolvency 
and guarantee fund payment, and (2) after the guarantee fund payment is made. 
                                                 
141  E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 41–45, 53–55. 
142  Id. 
143  See Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 art. 4. The Guarantee Mandate does not set out a minimum 
required amount of the guarantee fund payments, but rather provides that the limits “must not fall 
below a level which is socially compatible with the social objective of this Directive.” Id. 
144  Cf. E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 arts. 53–55. 
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1. Ex post: during the insolvency proceeding. 
Operating in tandem with the two stage payment of employee claims is the 
guarantee fund’s role in the primary insolvency proceeding. Upon paying 
employee claims, the guarantee funds become subrogated to those claims against 
the debtor, thus acquiring the right to pursue those claims against the debtor to 
recoup the costs of paying the employees in the first place.145 In this context, the 
claims the guarantee fund can bring against the debtor correlate evenly with the 
payments made to the employees: absent the guarantee fund, the total amount of 
claims against the debtor are not increasing or decreasing. Thus, for a debtor that 
employed 100 employees in a given State, that State’s guarantee fund could 
represent the claims of all 100 in the main insolvency proceeding following its 
payment of those employees’ claims. For a debtor that owed one employee in a 
given State $100 in back wages, that State’s guarantee fund would have a $100 
claim against the debtor. Likewise, if the guarantee fund in the latter example paid 
only $50 to the employee, the guarantee fund would have a $50 claim, and the 
employee would have her residual $50 claim, for a total amount claimed against 
the debtor of $100. 
It will be noted, and correctly so, that a regime in which a guarantee fund 
raises the entirety, or even a significant portion, of an employee’s claim in the main 
insolvency proceeding is a regime in which the guarantee fund is not likely to 
receive full satisfaction on that claim. The mere fact that the debtor is insolvent 
will tell even the most casual observer, however, that insolvent firms do not have 
enough assets to satisfy all of their obligations.  
The important question to ask, instead, is how this situation compares to the 
alternative. Under the approach advanced here, the employee is paid the amount 
they would have received under a domestic insolvency proceeding. This change 
necessarily means that the guarantee fund accepts the difference between what the 
employee would receive in a domestic proceeding and what an employee would 
receive in the primary insolvency proceeding as a loss on that particular 
“transaction.” This loss gets passed on to the funders of the guarantee fund in the 
form of higher required contributions.146 
The status quo alternative to this application of the Guarantee Mandate is 
that the employee is paid whatever fixed amount the Member State sets, and the 
employee raises the balance of the claim in the primary insolvency proceeding.147 
                                                 
145  See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 32, 43–44. 
146  Given that the fund is government operated and its sole business is paying employee claims arising 
out of insolvency, it definitionally falls to the funders of the guarantee fund, be they taxpayers or 
firms, to absorb any losses occasioned by payments to employees that are higher than the 
distributions received on account of the subrogated claims. Cf. SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 34–
35. 
147  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45. 
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The guarantee fund likewise raises a claim in the primary insolvency proceeding 
for the amount of the subrogated claim.148 Under the static approach currently 
employed, the only risk to the guarantee fund is that it receives less from the 
insolvency proceeding than the bare minimum payment level required by the 
Guarantee Fund. 
As this comparison indicates, the difference between the current legal regime 
and the one argued for here is that the guarantee fund assumes a higher risk of 
loss from a lack of assets to go around in the insolvency proceeding. This 
argument’s motivating fact, however, is that this risk of loss is not created out of 
thin air. It is assumed from the employees that bear it under the current state of 
the law. To be clear, the risk of insufficient assets existing to satisfy employee 
claims is currently borne by the employees themselves. Under the dynamic 
approach, the guarantee firm bears a greater segment of this risk, and is thus able 
to allocate that risk as a national policy choice. Put another way, the Guarantee 
Mandate and the E.U. Regulation, because of an imperfect harmonization in their 
provisions governing which bodies of law apply in certain cases, pass a great deal 
of the risk of insolvency onto employees in certain cases (those with cross-border 
implications), but not in other cases (those governed by purely domestic law). 
2. Ex ante: funding the guarantee fund. 
The means by which the guarantee fund compensates for the increased 
expected losses it would assume under the approach argued for here is precisely 
the same as the means by which it gathers funds currently. The guarantee fund 
will either gather funds from the tax base at large, spreading the risks of business 
insolvency across the national economy as a whole, or from levies on the business 
that operate in the State, spreading the risks among the firms that bear some 
likelihood of creating the problem the Guarantee Mandate seeks to prevent in the 
first place. This latter method of funding also permits the guarantee funds to 
allocate risk according to perceptions of the riskiness of the business endeavors, 
levying higher assessments against those firms that are perceived to be more likely 
to enter insolvency in the first place, thereby more fully tailoring the costs of the 
insolvency protections to those more likely to create them.149 
C. Concluding Thoughts on the Proposed Adjustment 
The current state of the legal regime governing E.U. cross-border 
insolvencies places a large portion of the risk of loss arising out of insolvency on 
                                                 
148  See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 32, 43–44; E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 art. 45. 
149  SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 34–35 (“In numerous jurisdictions, the guarantee fund is sector- or 
industry-funded, with premiums paid by corporations and other business enterprises, based on the 
risks inherent in the particular sector or industry.”). 
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employees. Espousing a general principle that employee claims are worthy of 
special protections in the insolvency process, the Guarantee Mandate has set a 
minimum level at which employee claims must be satisfied.150 However, when 
switching between multiple applicable bodies of law, the Guarantee Mandate and 
E.U. Regulation do not require Member States and their guarantee funds to 
internalize the risk inherent in switching from a legal regime in which an employee 
claim is afforded a priority (and thus under which employees would presumably 
recover more) to a legal regime in which employee claims do not receive a priority 
(and thus are expected to recover less, up to and including nothing).151 Instead, 
the employee-claimants that must bring their claims in the primary insolvency 
proceeding bear the majority of the risk that the change in applicable law will 
render their claim there moot.152 In addition to causing the employees’ expected 
losses from the insolvency of their employer to be higher than if the insolvency 
were governed purely by domestic law, which necessarily means that the 
employees are receiving disparate treatment relative to an identically-situated 
employee of a domestic firm, the Member States’ policy judgment that employee 
claims deserve the protection of both a guarantee fund and a priority in the 
insolvency proceedings is being frustrated. 
Because of this counter-intuitive and idiosyncratic treatment of a subset of 
creditors widely recognized to be especially vulnerable in insolvency proceedings, 
a new approach is warranted. It is argued that an approach to implementing 
Member States’ obligations under the Guarantee Mandate, under which the 
guarantee funds pay employee claims as they would have been paid under a purely 
domestic insolvency proceeding, rectifies the disparate treatment employee claims 
are currently receiving. In addition, this change to the Guarantee Mandate would 
have secondary benefits that accrue not just to employees but also to the other 
stakeholders in the debtor’s estate and gains to efficiency overall. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF A  CHANGED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
GUARANTEE MANDATE 
There are four major implications that flow from changing the way Member 
States implement the Guarantee Mandate: (1) employee claims are satisfied more 
quickly and uniformly; (2) Member States will better internalize the costs of their 
policy choices; (3) several gains to efficiency will result; and (4) Member States will 
have incentives to shift towards more harmonized insolvency regimes. 
                                                 
150  Guarantee Mandate, supra note 7 pmbl. 3. 
151  See, generally, id.; E.U. Regulation, supra note 1.  
152  The employees still are not bearing the full measure of the risk, given that the guarantee fund will 
be subrogated to some small part of the employees’ claim. Thus, in the situation where the employee 
is expected to receive nothing from the insolvency proceeding, it is equally the case that the 
guarantee fund would likewise receive nothing. 
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A.  Employee Claim Satisfaction  
As mentioned previously, the front-loaded implementation of the claim 
payment regime would have the effect of satisfying employee claims sooner than 
the current legal regime. As well, because the new method of implementation 
would result in the application of the law generally applicable to the employee 
outside of insolvency, the change in applicable law in insolvency contemplated by 
the E.U. Regulation will not result in structural discrimination against the claims 
of employees of a foreign firm. Rather, the employees’ rational expectation of 
equal treatment with otherwise identically situated employees will be vindicated 
by a regime that pays claims according to how they would be paid at domestic law, 
rather than applying a fragmented patchwork of two different bodies of law. 
B.  Member States’ Internalization of the Costs of the Chosen 
Employee Protection Scheme 
Under a regime that places greater costs upon the guarantee funds, the 
necessity for recouping those expected costs is correspondingly higher, and will 
fall to either the taxpayers writ large or the firms operating within the Member 
State.153 This is yet another avenue for national policy preferences to express 
themselves in the international legal regime. From the outset the Member States 
make a policy determination as to the proper way to spread the risks that 
insolvency creates for vulnerable creditors. The new legal rule would merely allow 
Member States to more accurately assess those risks and spread them around 
according to their relative judgment as to the appropriate distribution of risks. 
The Member States place certain amounts of risk on the employees by 
limiting the value, timeframe, and types of claims that the guarantee funds will 
make. The current legal regime creates an unbounded outlet for the balance of the 
risk, however, by not compensating for the lack of priority that employee-
claimants will receive in primary insolvency proceedings. The approach argued for 
here better accounts for this risk by requiring Member States to capture it, 
internalize it, and then distribute it throughout the various relevant stakeholders 
as it deems fit. 
C. Gains to Efficiency in the Administration of Cross-Border 
Insolvency Proceedings  
In addition to the benefits that this change in implementation would 
produce, this change in approach would produce efficiency gains for E.U. courts 
administering cross-border insolvencies. These gains would manifest themselves 
primarily in two ways. 
                                                 
153  See SARRA STUDY, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
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1. Increased efficiency caused by the subrogation of employee claims 
to the Member States’ guarantee funds. 
First, where guarantee funds pay employee claims according to domestic law, 
the logical conclusion is that employees’ claims will become aggregated in the 
guarantee funds. The guarantee funds can then represent all of the aggregated 
claims at once. As a result, where an insolvency proceeding could become clogged 
with a large number of employees all vying to be heard in the court of the main 
insolvency proceeding, the competent insolvency administrator would instead be 
dealing primarily with a sophisticated repeat player that can represent the 
aggregated employee claims to the extent it has already paid them. This can further 
the E.U. Regulation’s stated goal of streamlining insolvency administrations 
independent of the necessity to pay employee claims, given that they have already 
been satisfied in large part in the first instance by the guarantee fund.154 
2. The Member States’ guarantee funds, not foreign courts, can apply 
domestic law. 
Under the regime argued for here, the E.U. Regulation’s information sharing 
protocols permit domestic entities, be they courts or the guarantee funds 
themselves, to determine the appropriate amount of payments to employees in 
insolvency proceedings. Where the main insolvency proceeding is currently 
required to parse national law to the extent it is imported into the legal regime, 
this task can be passed off in large part to the guarantee funds of the Member 
State in which the claims originated. In addition to the fact that this change allows 
for a disaggregation of the legal questions the court in the main insolvency 
proceeding decides, a domestic entity deciding domestic law reduces the 
likelihood of errors, and the magnitude of the costs of those errors. Likewise, the 
repeat player status of the guarantee funds allows insolvency proceedings to take 
advantage of legal specialization by domestic entities in divining and applying their 
own bodies of law, further increasing the efficiency of the proceedings as a whole. 
D.  This Change in Implementation of the Guarantee Mandate 
Can Affect the Incentives of Member States in Selecting 
National Legal Regimes 
The natural corollary to the acknowledgement that this change allows 
Member States to more fully internalize the costs of their policy choices is that 
this might induce a change in national policy by the Member States. The logical 
effect of changing from a regime in which a claim is governed by no priority to 
one in which it is governed by a priority is that the claim is more likely to be 
satisfied more fully than before. If guarantee funds are now paying out more 
                                                 
154  See E.U. Regulation, supra note 1 pmbl. (3). 
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claims at higher rates than before, it might be the case that Member States, rather 
than increase the taxes on either businesses or the citizens, change their 
behavior.155 In such a case, the natural shift would be away from the use of a 
priority in insolvency distributions and toward a “pure” guarantee regime. It is not 
definitionally inefficient for parties to maintain a “hybrid” regime after the passage 
of the Guarantee Mandate. However, given that the Guarantee Mandate requires 
guarantee funds, to the extent that the “hybrid” regime requires additional 
procedures to harmonize it with the E.U. Regulation’s choice of law rules and the 
various  legal regimes of the Member States, a legal rule that shifts Member States 
away from “hybrid” regimes and towards “pure” guarantee regimes might tend to 
increase the efficiency of the E.U.-wide insolvency regime as a whole.156 
V.  CONCLUSION  
When cross-border insolvencies bring together two separate bodies of law, 
each authoritative in its sphere, and each with fundamentally different approaches 
to protecting employees during the insolvency process, the unintended 
consequence is that employees are not provided with the same protections as 
similarly situated employees of domestic firms.  
In considering this issue, it is clear that the E.U. Regulation makes 
improvements over the E.C. Regulation in several areas of relevance to the issue 
of employee claims. The increased requirements for information disclosure are 
likely to work to reduce the information asymmetry under which foreign 
employees operate and consequently the number of claims that are not lodged in 
the foreign proceeding because the employees are unaware of their right to do so. 
As well, the ability of the primary insolvency administrator to offer “undertakings” 
to creditors in secondary jurisdictions in order to avoid the institution of 
secondary insolvency proceedings and the provisions of Chapter V providing 
specifically for streamlining multi-entity insolvencies are likely to increase the 
                                                 
155  Cf. SARRA STUDY supra note 4, at 34–35. If the two major options for funding the guarantee funds 
are either (1) tax the businesses (with the ability to customize the tax’s application across different 
industries); or (2) spread the cost across the entire national economy (either via a dedicated tax for 
the guarantee fund or by funding the guarantee fund out of the State’s general fund—in either event 
the result being the same), States faced with the choice of raising taxes in two generally unpopular 
ways might, instead, change the structure of their insolvency regime, instead protecting employees 
only with a guarantee fund, rather than with a hybrid approach. 
156  This “net gain” to efficiency flows logically from the conclusion that Member States are not likely 
to eliminate employee protections because of a changed implementation of the Guarantee Mandate, 
but the change in implementation is likely to have an effect on the “drift” of insolvency regimes 
within the European Union by virtue of the new incentives the changed implementation provides. 
Thus, wholly independent of the fact that, under this dynamic approach, all employees in a given 
State would receive the benefits of the State’s policy choices, all employees—indeed, all stakeholders 
in the insolvency—could expect to benefit by virtue of the increasingly streamlined administration 
of cross-border insolvencies. 
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efficiency of insolvency administration in its entirety, thus allowing for efficiency 
gains to accrue to all creditors, including the debtor’s employees. 
However, the conjunction of the lack of specific provision for employee 
claims beyond simply allowing for the lex fori to control and the provisions of the 
Guarantee Mandate making the lex situs authoritative means that the wide range 
of differences between the insolvency regimes of the different E.U. Member 
States can limit the recovery employees receive. The national law governing 
guarantee funds controls the employee’s recovery from the fund, but the lex fori 
controls the employee’s recovery in the insolvency proceeding. The result is that 
employees identically situated but for the headquarters of their employer would 
secure different recoveries. 
However, the provisions of the Guarantee Mandate and the E.U. Regulation 
for integrating national law lead to a solution that can eliminate the disparities 
between similarly-situated employees with regard to the satisfaction of employee 
claims in insolvency proceedings. A slight change in the way Member States 
implement the Guarantee Mandate can lead to the fuller expression of Member 
States’ policy choices regarding employee protection in insolvency. Likewise, it 
can improve the outcomes for employees of companies headquartered abroad as 
a general matter as well as relative to their similarly situated counterparts that work 
for domestic companies. Finally, if Member States change the way they implement 
the Guarantee Mandate as outlined here, the resulting legal regime can further the 
goals of the E.U.-wide regulations in increasing the efficiency of the 
administration of cross-border insolvencies as a whole. 
